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ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE AS A DETERMINANT
OF PERFORMANCE: EVIDENCE FROM MUTUAL
FUNDS
FELIPE A. CSASZAR*
Stephen M. Ross School of Business, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Michigan,
U.S.A.
This article develops and tests a model of how organizational structure influences organizational
performance. Organizational structure, conceptualized as the decision-making structure among
a group of individuals, is shown to affect the number of initiatives pursued by organizations and
the omission and commission errors (Type I and II errors, respectively) made by organizations.
The empirical setting is more than 150,000 stock-picking decisions made by 609 mutual funds.
Mutual funds offer an ideal and rare setting to test the theory, since there are detailed records on
the projects they face, the decisions they make, and the outcomes of these decisions. The study’s
independent variable, organizational structure, is coded based on fund management descriptions
made by Morningstar, and estimates of the omission and commission errors are computed
by a novel technique that uses bootstrapping to create measures that are comparable across
funds. The findings suggest that organizational structure has relevant and predictable effects
on a wide range of organizations. In particular, the article shows empirically that increasing
the consensus threshold required by a committee in charge of selecting projects leads to more
omission errors, fewer commission errors, and fewer approved projects. Applications include
designing organizations that achieve a given mix of exploration and exploitation, as well as
predicting the consequences of centralization and decentralization. This work constitutes the
first large-sample empirical test of the model by Sah and Stiglitz (1986). Copyright  2012 John
Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
INTRODUCTION
There is a long-standing concern that the strategy
literature needs a better understanding of the rela-
tionship between organizational structure and per-
formance. This concern goes back at least to Cyert
and March (1963: 21), who posed the following
questions when motivating their theoretical enter-
prise: ‘what happens to information as it is pro-
cessed through the organization? What predictable
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screening biases are there in an organization?’
Yet with few exceptions, questions of this sort
remain largely unexplored in the strategy literature
(Rumelt, Schendel, and Teece, 1994: 42). The lack
of knowledge about how decision-making structure
affects organizational performance surfaces repeat-
edly in different areas of management. For exam-
ple, in the context of ambidextrous organizations,
Raisch and Birkinshaw (2008: 380) note that ‘far
less research has traditionally been devoted to how
organizations achieve organizational ambidexter-
ity,’ and in the context of R&D organization,
Argyres and Silverman (2004: 929) show surprise
‘that so little research has addressed the issue of
how internal R&D organization affects the direc-
tions and impact of technological innovation by
Copyright  2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
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multidivisional firms.’ These observations are con-
gruent with the view that organization design—the
field specifically devoted to studying the links
between environment, organizational structure, and
organizational outcomes—is, in many respects, an
emerging field despite its long history (Daft and
Lewin, 1993; Zenger and Hesterly, 1997; Foss,
2003).
This article contributes to a better understanding
of the relationship between organizational struc-
ture and organizational performance by providing
the first large sample empirical test of the the-
ory developed by Sah and Stiglitz (1986). Among
other predictions, this theory establishes a causal
link between the structure of a decision-making
committee and the number of omission and com-
mission errors the committee will make. Errors
of omission and commission (which are equiv-
alent, respectively, to Type I and II errors in
statistics) correspond to missing good choices
(omissions) and pursuing bad choices (commis-
sions). Specifically, Sah and Stiglitz’s (1986)
theory predicts that committees with a high con-
sensus level (e.g., requiring unanimous approval)
will make relatively few commission errors but
many omission errors. In contrast, committees with
a low consensus level (e.g., requiring the approval
of just one of its members) will exhibit the oppo-
site behavior: they will make few omission errors
but many commission errors. Additionally, the the-
ory predicts that the higher the consensus level, the
fewer projects that will be pursued by the commit-
tee. This article finds empirical support for these
three predictions of the Sah and Stiglitz model.
The Sah and Stiglitz model makes predictions
regarding organizational performance (e.g., ex-
pected omission and commission errors of a given
organization design). Yet in many cases, by using a
contingency or ‘fit’-type of logic, one may extend
the reach of their model to infer predictions regard-
ing competitive performance (e.g., profitability in
the face of competition). For instance, all other
things being equal, if in a given competitive situ-
ation omission errors are costlier than commission
errors, then a firm whose organizational design
produces fewer omission errors will be more prof-
itable than one whose design produces more omis-
sion errors.
From a practical standpoint, empirically validat-
ing Sah and Stiglitz’s theory is relevant because
it has performance implications for committees, a
widespread decision-making structure. Moreover,
committees are used in many settings relevant to
strategic decision making, such as boards of direc-
tors, top management teams, finance committees,
and investment teams.
From a theoretical standpoint, confirming the
Sah and Stiglitz model is of special interest to
organization design, as their theory provides a
parsimonious mechanism to explain how micro
decisions (individual choices) are aggregated by
an organizational architecture into macro behav-
iors (organization-level performance). In fact, by
separating performance into omission and commis-
sion errors and then linking structural choices to
the occurrence of these errors, Sah and Stiglitz’s
model sheds light on such organization design
issues as the implications of centralization and
decentralization and how organizations can pursue
exploration and exploitation.
It is especially important to test the Sah and
Stiglitz model because it has spawned a large num-
ber of descendants.1 Thus, all these works rely
critically on the untested validity of its prede-
cessor. Despite there being many ways in which
the work of Sah and Stiglitz (1986) can illumi-
nate managerial phenomena, few of the references
have come from the management field. The occa-
sional exceptions include work on mergers and
acquisitions (Gulati and Higgins, 2003; Puranam,
Powell, and Singh, 2006), venture capital (Lerner,
1994), technological choices (Garud, Nayyar, and
Shapira, 1997), the implications of alternative eval-
uation on search (Knudsen and Levinthal, 2007),
and analyzing the errors of more complex organi-
zational structures (Csaszar, 2009; Christensen and
Knudsen, 2010). Perhaps the lack of empirical val-
idation explains why few of the references to the
work of Sah and Stiglitz (1986) have come from
the, largely empirical, management field.
Sah and Stiglitz’s theory is so simple—it is
based solely on the probabilities that different vot-
ing rules have of vetoing projects—that one may
be tempted to suppose their predictions are obvi-
ously true in organizations resembling those in
the theory. But without empirical validation, it
is not obvious whether Sah and Stiglitz’s (1986)
terse description of organizations has predictive
value. For example, it could be that their idea
of looking at organizations as veto mechanisms
1 At the time of this writing, more than 180 citations according
to ISI Web of Science.
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greatly oversimplifies the communication capac-
ity of individuals or the information aggregation
rules actually used by organizations. Alternatively,
it could be that the process described by Sah
and Stiglitz (1986) does operate in organizations,
but that its effects are minuscule when compared
with other concurrent effects, such as groupthink
(Janis, 1972), herding (Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer,
and Welch, 1992), power (Pfeffer, 1992), decision
biases (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979), or mas-
sive inaccuracies in managerial decision making
(Starbuck and Mezias, 1996). In sum, determining
the falsifiability of Sah and Stiglitz’s theory is an
empirical question. Science progresses by theory
building and theory testing, but Sah and Stiglitz’s
theory-building effort has, until now, lacked an
accompanying theory-testing effort.
This article tests Sah and Stiglitz’s model by
using data on the decision-making structure and
on the omission and commission errors of mutual
funds. One could argue that Sah and Stiglitz’s the-
ory has not yet been tested empirically because
collecting information on organizational structure
and errors (particularly omissions) is difficult.
Luckily, mutual funds offer a rare opportunity to
observe all the required information: mutual funds’
decision-making structure (which squarely maps
into the committees described by Sah and Stiglitz)
is observable from analysts’ reports; and omission
and commission errors can be measured by looking
at the investment universe of each fund, the assets
that each fund decides to buy and not to buy from
that investment universe, and the ex post return of
each asset.
The current study explores a particular aspect
of organization design using a particular setting.
Hence, two questions regarding generalizability
emerge: how prevalent is the mechanism stud-
ied, and how representative is the setting. The
mechanism studied—voting—is certainly preva-
lent, although it is unlikely to occur in such a
stylized way as described by Sah and Stiglitz’s
model. In the real world it is probable that other
phenomena (e.g., power, politics, herding) would
co-occur. It is interesting that, despite the pos-
sibility that any number of factors influence the
relationship between structure and organizational
performance, the results reported here are consis-
tent with Sah and Stiglitz’s parsimonious char-
acterization. Regarding the second question, on
how representative is the mutual funds setting, one
characteristic of this setting that suggests that the
findings reported here may occur elsewhere is that
mutual funds are among the most stringent settings
imaginable: stock returns are eminently random
(Fama, 1970), so it is hard to imagine that orga-
nizational structure could affect any outcome of
stock picking. Finding empirical support in this
setting, therefore, suggests empirical support in
other, less stringent settings.
The next section of this article describes the
mechanism underlying the Sah and Stiglitz model;
the following section connects the theory of Sah
and Stiglitz to the management literature. Then
the tested hypotheses are presented, the empirical
setting is described, and the results are presented.
Finally, the broader theoretical and managerial
implications of this research are discussed.
AN OVERVIEW OF THE SAH
AND STIGLITZ MODEL FROM
AN ORGANIZATION DESIGN
PERSPECTIVE
To understand the scope and applicability of Sah
and Stiglitz’s model, it is useful to start by describ-
ing how it fits within the three fundamental themes
of organization design: (1) organizational search or
alternative generation (e.g., Rivkin and Siggelkow,
2003; Ethiraj and Levinthal, 2004); (2) alternative
evaluation (e.g., Gavetti and Levinthal, 2000;
Knudsen and Levinthal, 2007); and (3) execution
or implementation (e.g., Hrebiniak and Joyce,
1984; Galbraith and Kazanjian, 1986). In light of
this characterization, the work of Sah and Stiglitz
(1986) falls precisely in the category of alternative
evaluation.
Sah and Stiglitz (1986, 1988)2 model how com-
mittees screen projects: that is, how effective
they are at separating good projects from bad
ones. Although originally developed to compare
the performance of central planning with that
of free markets, Sah and Stiglitz’s model can
shed light on a broader set of organizational
issues because many organizations use committee-
like structures. Examples include banks choosing
which loans to approve, venture capital firms and
mutual funds picking investments, movie studios
2 The paper by Sah and Stiglitz (1988) generalizes Sah and
Stiglitz (1986) to committees with arbitrary size and consensus
levels. For succinctness, only the earlier paper is cited hereafter.
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judging scripts, hiring committees selecting candi-
dates, and top management teams deciding which
strategic projects to pursue.
Sah and Stiglitz model committees as compris-
ing N decision makers, of which C must approve
a project for it to be approved by the commit-
tee (C stands for ‘consensus level’). For example,
an organization of three members that approves
a project when any member decides to approve
it is represented by N = 3 and C = 1, or simply
3/1; likewise, 2/2 denotes a two-member organiza-
tion that only approves projects for which there is
consensus. An organization consisting of a single
individual is denoted 1/1.
The model assumes that individuals are fallible
(i.e., individuals perceive reality in a noisy fash-
ion), homogeneous, and uncorrelated (i.e., noises
in perception are independent and identically dis-
tributed); it also assumes that projects are described
by a single number (i.e., a project quality, which is
imperfectly perceived). Like all models, this styl-
ized description of organizations leaves many phe-
nomena outside of its scope, such as organizations
whose task is different from screening projects,
heterogeneity in ability, group dynamics such as
herding (Bikhchandani et al., 1992) or groupthink
(Janis, 1972), and, more generally, organizational
structures different from those describable in terms
of N and C. Nonetheless, the model does permit
one to focus on some basic mechanisms that are
pervasive within organizations: how centralized or
decentralized the decision process of an organiza-
tion is and how many individuals are involved in it.
The following examples illustrate how the model
captures these organizational characteristics.
For instance, a 3/3 could represent the decision-
making process within a venture capital firm in
which the three partners must agree on any invest-
ment; it could also represent a three-level hierarchy
in which projects received by a low-level employee
must escalate up to the CEO for approval. In both
examples, all three individuals must concur on the
project’s viability before it is approved by the orga-
nization. In contrast, a 3/1 could represent either of
the following decentralized structures: a firm with
three research engineers, any one of whom may
independently decide to pursue further research on
a new technology; or it could represent a mutual
fund with three autonomous fund managers, any
one of whom may authorize the purchase of a secu-
rity. In these last two examples, it suffices that one
of the three individuals likes the project in order
for it to be approved.
If the number of decision makers on the com-
mittee is fixed, the main predictions of Sah and
Stiglitz’s model are that, on average, lowering
the consensus level leads to: (1) more approved
projects, (2) fewer omission errors, and (3) more
commission errors.
These three predictions can be explained using
basic probability theory. The next example illus-
trates the effect of structure on the number of
projects approved—that is, Prediction 1 of the
model. Imagine two decision makers, each with
a 50 percent chance of approving a project, fac-
ing 100 projects to be screened. If unanimity is
required (i.e., if both decision makers must agree
that a project is good for it to be approved),
then they would approve on average 25 projects
(= 100 × 0.5 × 0.5). If instead the approval of just
one decision maker is required, then the orga-
nization would approve on average 75 projects
(conversely to the previous case, now each project
is accepted unless both decision makers reject
it: 100 − 25 = 75). Although the examples so far
have assumed that decision makers are homoge-
neous (i.e., in the example the two managers had
the same 50% probability of approving a project),
the model can be extended to accommodate het-
erogeneous decision makers. But homogeneity is a
reasonable assumption in some settings, as when
managers have similar training, and also more gen-
erally because, on average, heterogeneous settings
behave like homogeneous settings. (For example,
a committee whose members have a probability of
approval uniformly distributed between 40% and
60% behaves, on average, like a committee whose
members have a 50% probability of approval.)
The effect of structure on omission and com-
mission errors (Predictions 2 and 3) can be simi-
larly illustrated. Imagine that only 50 of the 100
projects are good and that each decision maker
has equal probability of accepting and reject-
ing good and bad projects (i.e., there is a 25%
chance of each decision maker either accepting
a good project, accepting a bad project, reject-
ing a good project, or rejecting a bad project).
Then, the unanimous committee (which Sah and
Stiglitz (1986) call a hierarchy) would make on
average 6.25 commission errors (i.e., #projects
× probability that both decision makers accept a
bad project = 100 × 0.25 × 0.25) and 43.75 omis-
sion errors (i.e., #projects × probability that any
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of the decision makers reject a good project =
100 × [0.25 + 0.25–0.252]). A committee requir-
ing the approval of only one decision maker (which
Sah and Stiglitz (1986) call a polyarchy) exhibits
the converse behavior: on average, it would make
6.25 omission errors (i.e., #projects × probability
that both decision makers reject a good project)
and 43.75 commission errors (i.e., #projects ×
probability that any of the decision makers accept
a bad project).3
Although not developed for this purpose, the
Sah and Stiglitz model can be used to analyze
the effects of centralization and decentralization
in organizations. The applicability of their model
to these effects stems from the facts that ‘decision
makers generally base their actions on estimates
formulated at other points in the organization’
(Cyert and March, 1963: 85) and that, in cen-
tralized organizations, these estimates must ‘flow
up’ through more decision makers (before reach-
ing the final decision maker) than in decentralized
organizations (Robbins, 1990: 6). Thus, the infor-
mation flow in centralized organizations resembles
that of hierarchies, whereas the information flow
in decentralized organizations resembles that of
polyarchies. In sum, the Sah and Stiglitz frame-
work captures the dynamic of information passing
through more filters in centralized than in decen-
tralized organizations.
The appendix generalizes the examples given
here by developing a model that makes the same
qualitative predictions but under more general
assumptions (regarding number of decision mak-
ers, consensus level, individual screening abilities,
and types of incoming projects). The model in the
appendix does not present new theory, but it does
serve as a concise summary of the work of Sah
and Stiglitz (1986) that is useful for the purposes
of this article.
THEORETICAL MOTIVATION
What are the effects of organizational structure
on organizational performance? This is among
3 Calculations similar to these—that is, conjunctive (AND) and
disjunctive (OR) probabilities—are commonly used in reliability
theory (e.g., Rausand and Høyland, 2004). Note that Sah (1991:
68) mentions a classic work on reliability (Moore and Shannon,
1956/1993) as an antecedent of the Sah and Stiglitz (1986)
model.
the fundamental questions in the fields of strat-
egy (Rumelt et al., 1994: 42) and organization
theory (Thompson, 1967), so it is no surprise
that it has been addressed extensively from sev-
eral perspectives since old, even biblical (Van
Fleet and Bedeian, 1977: 357), times. Therefore,
rather than attempting the impossible task of sum-
marizing these literatures, this section presents a
broad overview with an emphasis on highlighting
the main differences and similarities between cur-
rent and previous approaches. The review focuses
mainly on organizational structures whose build-
ing blocks are individuals (as in Cyert and March,
1963), not business divisions (as in Chandler,
1962). The focus on this kind of structures is
consistent with the Carnegie tradition understand-
ing of organizational structure as ‘the pattern of
communications and relations among a group of
human beings, including the processes for making
and implementing decisions’ (Simon, 1947/1997:
18–19).
This section is organized in terms of three main
disciplines that share an interest in how organi-
zational structure affects performance: organiza-
tion design, organizational economics, and signal
detection theory.
Organization design
Important early attempts at understanding the rela-
tionship between structure and performance are
present in the work of Chandler (1962) and Barnard
(1938). Their work, like most ensuing efforts in
organization design, took an information process-
ing perspective. For instance, Chandler (1962:
69–70) cites memos from Du Pont’s reorganiza-
tion in 1919 that were explicit about the role of
information processing: ‘the most efficient results
are obtained at least expense when we coordi-
nate related effort and segregate unrelated effort.’
Similarly, Barnard (1938: 215) mentions that ‘the
function of executives is to serve as channels of
communication so far as communication must pass
though central positions.’
Influenced by Barnard, Simon (1947/1997)
developed a more formal understanding of orga-
nizations as information processing devices com-
posed of boundedly rational individuals. Under
this view, organizational structure plays a cen-
tral role, as it defines how information flows
and is aggregated inside organizations, allowing
organizations to accomplish goals that would be
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otherwise unattainable by any of its individual
members. Led by Simon (1947/1997), Cyert and
March (1963) gave organizational structure a cen-
tral place in the Carnegie tradition. However, with
one exception (Cohen, March, and Olsen, 1972),
this tradition devoted most of its energies to deci-
sion making in the absence of concerns about
organizational structure. In fact, organizational
structure has recently been called a ‘forgotten pil-
lar’ of this tradition (Gavetti, Levinthal, and Oca-
sio, 2007: 525).
The work of Sah and Stiglitz (1986) is consis-
tent with the information processing perspective
that permeates the organization design literature:
it views the role of organizational structure as
a means to aggregate the information coming
from boundedly rational, fallible individuals. Yet
in addition to being consistent with organiza-
tion design, it extends the information process-
ing approach by offering a new set of predictions
about structure and types of projects approved. By
providing empirical support for Sah and Stiglitz’s
model, this article aims to pave the way for these
predictions to be used fruitfully in organization
design.
Organizational economics
Several models in organizational economics have
studied the effect of structure on performance.
In broad terms, the organizational economics lit-
erature on structure can be divided into two
strands: incentives4 and information processing.
The current article is directly related to this latter
strand.
The information processing strand of the organi-
zational literature has dealt mainly with the selec-
tion of projects and the efficiency aspects of project
implementation. Early works along these lines
include Williamson (1967) on optimal hierarchy
size and Marschak and Radner (1972) on opti-
mal decision making by teams. More recent work
has studied efficiency measures of hierarchies (e.g.,
Radner, 1992; Bolton and Dewatripont, 1994; Van
4 The incentives strand has dealt mainly with project imple-
mentation or execution. Topics studied include the relationship
between the manager’s incentives and the range of projects
implemented by the firm (Rotemberg and Saloner, 1994); the
interplay between organizational structure and formal authority
(Aghion and Tirole, 1997); and the types of projects that are
better served by managers who persuade employees instead of
resorting to authority (Van den Steen, 2009).
Zandt, 1999); the optimal organization of produc-
tion as a function of environmental uncertainty
(Cremer, 1980); the acquisition of knowledge by
hierarchies with heterogeneous agents (Geanakop-
los and Milgrom, 1991; Garicano, 2000); the extent
to which hierarchies can accommodate coordina-
tion and specialization (Hart and Moore, 2005);
and the relative performance of such common
organizational forms as the M-form and the U-
form (Harris and Raviv, 2002; Qian, Roland, and
Xu, 2006).
Sah and Stiglitz (1986) contribute to orga-
nizational economics by introducing two new
elements: modeling communication patterns as
sequential or parallel circuits and measuring per-
formance as omission and commission errors. The
literature that has descended from the work of
Sah and Stiglitz (1986) has been primarily the-
oretical and focused on voting (see the intro-
duction of Christensen and Knudsen (2010) for
a review), so the application of their model to
organization design issues remains largely unex-
plored.
Signal detection theory
Almost without connection to the previous litera-
tures, a rich body of work that addresses many of
the same questions has been developed in social
psychology, under the label of signal detection
theory, and in the closely related theory of social
decision schemes.
Signal detection theory (Peterson, Birdsall, and
Fox, 1954; Green and Swets, 1966; Macmillan and
Creelman, 2004) provides a mathematical frame-
work to analyze perception and decision making
by fallible individuals. This theory conceptual-
izes decision makers as trying to detect a signal
in a noisy environment, and it provides a set of
models, measures, and experiments to assess how
good decision makers are at detecting those sig-
nals under different settings. This theory was first
used to measure the sensory acuity of military per-
sonnel (i.e., radar operators) and was later adapted
to study myriad discrimination problems in cog-
nitive processes (e.g., medical diagnosis, weather
forecasting, quality control).5 Given the general-
ity of signal detection theory, many problems of
5 The updated bibliography on the 1988 reprint edition of the
classic book on the subject (Green and Swets, 1966) lists more
than 1,000 studies published on the subject during the period
from 1967 to 1988 alone.
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choice can be seen as special cases of it. Of par-
ticular interest to this article is that some problems
of managerial decision making have been ana-
lyzed from a signal detection perspective: Puranam
et al. (2006) use the theory to study M&As and
Garud et al. (1997) use it to study technological
innovation.
One of the contributions of signal detection the-
ory is representing the omission and commission
errors of different decision makers via a ‘receiver
operating characteristic curve’ (Figure 1 is akin
to that representation). Although signal detection
theory and the Sah and Stiglitz model both pay
explicit attention to omission and commission
errors and to their costs, one difference between
these approaches is that, whereas Sah and Stiglitz
(1986) study the performance of committees, sig-
nal detection theory studies the performance of
individuals.
The theory of social decision schemes (Davis,
1973, 1992) is similar to the work of Sah and
Stiglitz on committees in that it presents mathemat-
ical models of group decision making (although
performance is not measured as omission and
commission errors). This literature has produced
empirical results (Stoner, 1961; Stasser and Titus,
1985; Hinsz, Tindale, and Vollrath, 1997); how-
ever, because the experiments have primarily been
conducted in the laboratory using small groups
that meet for brief times, reported results may not
be generalizable to more complex organizations
(Argote and Greve, 2007: 344).
In sum, an empirically validated version of the
Sah and Stiglitz model can serve to combine the
strengths of both signal detection theory (i.e., its
focus on omission and commission errors) and
social decision schemes (its focus on groups),
thereby bringing closer to organization design the
rich bodies of work on group decision making that
are based in social psychology.
Although the reviewed literatures have provided
many important insights regarding the impact
of structure on performance, the field of orga-
nizations lacks an empirically validated theory
that—starting from structure at the level of indi-
viduals—is able to predict organization-level
measures of performance that are relevant to firm
strategy. If empirically validated, Sah and Stiglitz’s
model would offer such a theory. The contribution
of this article is to test this theory empirically for
the first time.
HYPOTHESES
The independent variable of the study is organi-
zational structure which, from the data set used,
can reliably be coded into three nonoverlapping
categories: (1) mutual funds managed by one indi-
vidual (in terms of the model outlined earlier,
this corresponds to N = 1 and C = 1); (2) mutual
funds managed by more than one individual, with
each individual operating independently from the
others (in terms of the model, N > 1 and C = 1);
and (3) mutual funds managed by more than one
individual and where decisions are made unani-
mously (in terms of the model, N > 1 and C =
N). For brevity, these structures will be referred
to (respectively) as individual, decentralized, and
centralized. Because of data limitations to be dis-
cussed later, the data set does not contain struc-
tures featuring intermediate levels of consensus
(i.e., N/C with 1 < C < N , such as N = 7 and
C = 6).
The dependent variables of the study are the
three outcomes predicted by the model: number of
approved projects, omission errors, and commis-
sion errors. Because the model predicts that these
three outcomes are most different for centralized
versus decentralized structures, the hypotheses are
stated as comparisons between those two struc-
tures. It would be possible to formulate six fur-
ther hypotheses comparing individual managers to
centralized structures and individual managers to
decentralized structures; but, to avoid a litany of
hypotheses, these comparisons are discussed in the
results section without being formally enumerated
here.
The three hypotheses are equivalent to the three
properties of Sah and Stiglitz’s model described
earlier. These three hypotheses encompass all the
mechanisms exposed in Sah and Stiglitz (1986,
1988) regarding committees with exogenously
given screening functions.
Hypothesis 1: Decentralized organizations
accept more projects than centralized
organizations.
Hypothesis 2: Decentralized organizations make
fewer omission errors than centralized
organizations.
Hypothesis 3: Decentralized organizations make
more commission errors than centralized
organizations.
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EMPIRICAL SETTING AND APPROACH
Empirical challenge
Before delving into the specifics of the data set and
statistical methods, it is important to understand
the structure of the empirical problem. To test the
hypotheses, all of the following must be observed:
(1) organizations making decisions about projects,
(2) a measure of the quality of each project decided
upon, (3) the decision that each organization made
with respect to every project it faced, and (4) the
organizational structure of each organization. Item
1 exists in many settings (e.g., firms deciding
whom to hire, where to expand, what to sell). Item
2 is also readily available in settings where the
ex post value of the project is visible and can proxy
for the project’s true quality. In the venture capital
context, for example, it could be a function of the
IPO value of a start-up in which a venture capitalist
considered investing; in the R&D context, it could
be the number of citations accrued by a patent after
a firm had the opportunity to buy it.
Yet items 3 and 4 are serious hurdles for the
empirical researcher. First, there is typically no
track record of the projects an organization consid-
ered but decided not to pursue (e.g., all the firms
a venture capitalist screened but did not invest
in). Second, organizational structure is not avail-
able from public databases. Organizational charts
are sometimes available, but they give no indica-
tion of whether a given decision-making process is
centralized or decentralized (e.g., by looking at an
organizational chart, it is not possible to know the
decision process used to set the direction of R&D,
perform M&As, or decide on IT investments).
Mutual funds offer a rare window into the impli-
cations of organization design on organizational
performance because, in this setting, the four nec-
essary ingredients are observable: (1) managing
a mutual fund is essentially about making deci-
sions (i.e., deciding what to buy and what to
sell); (2) the ex post return of each investment is
a good measure of the quality of each decision;6
(3) regulations require funds to disclose their hold-
ings periodically, which allows the researcher
to distinguish between accepted ‘projects’ (i.e.,
stocks that were bought) and those that the fund
6 Stock returns are exogenously given (in most plausible cases
they do not depend on anything a fund manager can do) and,
thus, provide a good match for Sah and Stiglitz’s model, which
treats quality as exogenously given.
rejected (stocks that were not bought); and (4)
organizational structure is observable from descrip-
tions of the fund management prepared by Morn-
ingstar. Additionally, there are thousands of mutual
funds, and the typical fund makes dozens of deci-
sions per quarter. All these considerations make
mutual funds an exceptional vehicle for studying
the effects of organization design on organizational
performance; indeed, mutual funds would make
a good aspirant for the ‘fruit fly’ of organization
design.
Despite these virtues of mutual funds as an
empirical setting, there is a strong tradition in
the finance literature that maintains organizational
structure should not be a determinant of fund
performance. In a nutshell, the efficient market
hypothesis (EMH) (Fama, 1970) purports that all
available information is already reflected in asset
prices, rendering future returns unpredictable. If
that is true, organizational structure should not
predict mutual fund performance. However, two
caveats apply. First, the EMH’s performance mea-
sure is financial return, not omission and commis-
sion errors.7 Second, the EMH is no longer viewed
as invulnerable, since a vast literature on market
anomalies (e.g., Goetzmann and Ibbotson, 1994;
Chevalier and Ellison, 1999; Cohen, Frazzini, and
Malloy, 2008) has emerged in the last 20 years.
Because the variance explained by market
anomalies is small (e.g., the typical R2 of an
anomaly is less than 1%), any variance explained
by organizational structure is not expected to be
large. A further implication is that any explanatory
power the model has will likely increase in settings
where the link between cause and effect is more
deterministic. Since stock picking is arguably one
of the most random task environments possible, it
follows that mutual funds make for a stringent test-
ing arena and that the results of this article serve
as conservative estimates.
Independent variable: mutual fund
organizational structure
A mutual fund is a type of investment that pools
money from many investors to buy a portfolio of
different securities such as stocks, bonds, money
7 A surprising result of this article is that the organizational
structure of a fund can affect its omission and commission errors
in such a way that financial return is not affected—a result that
supports the apparently contradictory predictions of both Sah
and Stiglitz (1986) and Fama (1970).
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Table 1. Examples of how organizational structure is coded from Morningstar’s fund descriptions (the ticker symbol
of each fund is given in parentheses)
Structure (N/C) Excerpts from Morningstar’s mutual fund description
1/1 ‘Ron Baron has been at the helm since the fund’s inception. . . He’s the driving force behind
this portfolio. . . buys companies he thinks can. . .’ (BPTRX)
2/1 ‘Managers Scott Glasser and Peter Hable each run 50 percent of the portfolio. . .’ (CSGWX)
3/1 ‘Three management firms select 10 stocks apiece for this fund’s portfolio.’ (SFVAX)
5/1 ‘(The fund) divvies up assets among five subadvisors, and each picks eight to 15 stocks
according to his own investing style.’ (MSSFX)
2/2 ‘Teresa McRoberts and Patrick Kelly became comanagers of this fund in late September 2004. . .
They don’t pay too much attention to traditional valuation metrics such as. . .’ (ACAAX)
7/7 ‘All investment decisions are vetted by the entire seven-person team. . . Management populates
the fund with 30–50 stocks. . .’ (CBMDX)
market instruments, or other securities. Mutual
funds in the United States are regulated by the
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC);
among other requirements, the SEC requires funds
to report their portfolio holdings at the end of the
last trading day of every quarter (Form 13F) and
periodically identify their fund managers (Form
487). Mutual funds are heavily scrutinized not only
by the SEC but also by institutional investors and
investment research firms.
Morningstar, one of the leading investment re-
search firms, offers information about mutual funds
to investors and financial advisors. Using public
sources and periodically meeting with fund man-
agers, Morningstar’s analysts produce a one-page
report—densely packed with statistics and anal-
ysis—for each fund they track. For the present
study, the most important element of these profiles
is a section entitled ‘governance and management,’
which presents a short biography of the managers
and describes how they manage the portfolio. This
section of the report contains enough information
to code organizational structure as modeled in this
article (in terms of number of managers, N , and
level of consensus required, C). To understand how
the coding was done, consider the excerpts shown
in Table 1, which illustrate typical descriptions. To
increase consistency, four rules were followed for
the coding:
1. If the description mentions managers’ names,
N is set to the number of people mentioned as
manager or comanager, with the exception of
people who are described explicitly as having a
secondary role (e.g., if a manager is described
as subordinate, performing administrative tasks,
not participating in the day-to-day management,
or recently promoted but retaining his/her ana-
lyst tasks).
2. If the description is explicit about the number
of ‘sleeves’ or subadvisors, or if it describes
how managers split their portfolios, N is set to
the number of divisions of the portfolio and C
is set to 1 (since this is a decentralized fund).
3. If two or more managers are mentioned but
nothing is said about how they coordinate
(e.g., they are addressed as a plurality, as in
‘they invest in. . .’), it is assumed that the fund
employs a consensus (N = C) decision proce-
dure. This is reasonable, as this is the default
structure of comanaged funds, and because if
managers work separately, they have no incen-
tive to being reported as working in tandem
(managers want to create their own reputation).
4. If no specific manager names are mentioned
(e.g., the description mentions only a generic
‘the management’) or if the description states
that the fund is run by an algorithm (some funds
that track indices operate like this), the fund is
left unclassified.
Less than 4 percent of the funds fell in the
unclassified group and less than 1 percent of the
funds had a consensus level other than 1 or N .
These two classes of funds were eliminated from
the data set.
Because fund descriptions do not include such
nuances as the relative sizes of each sleeve of
a decentralized fund, the organizational structure
of the subadvisor of each sleeve, or the share of
power each manager has in a centralized fund,
the funds were aggregated into three broader cat-
egories: 1/1 (managed by an individual), N /1
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(decentralized), and N/N (centralized). This deci-
sion ensures against overinterpreting the results.
All the funds were coded both by the author and
one research assistant. The percentage of agree-
ment between both categorizations was 96 percent.
The results presented here use the author’s catego-
rization, but all the results are robust to using the
other categorization.
Dependent variables: omission and commission
errors
The main intuition behind the measures of omis-
sion and commission error developed in this article
is as follows: in hindsight, a commission error
occurred whenever a fund bought an asset that
turned out to have a poor performance (i.e., whose
ex post return fell below a given benchmark); sim-
ilarly, an omission error occurred whenever a fund
failed to buy an asset that turned out to have a good
performance.8 To observe these errors, two types
of data are required: the list of assets that a fund
did and did not buy, and the returns of these assets.
Good data sources exist for both elements.
In order to make the discussion more precise,
some notation is useful. For a given mutual fund
F at time t , let A = {a1, a2, . . . , an} be the set
of assets that F bought during time period t
(subscript t is omitted for convenience). The best
available information on mutual fund holdings is
reported quarterly, so hereafter the unit of time
is one quarter. Let U = {u1, u2, . . . , uM} represent
the assets in which F can invest, or F ’s investment
universe at time t . The number of assets bought by
F at period t is n, and the number of assets in its
investment universe at time t is M . By definition,
the assets bought by a fund are a subset of the
fund’s investment universe, A ⊆ U .
Asset returns are measured as holding period
returns; that is, r(a) represents the total return of
asset a from the end of period t to the end of period
t + 1 (this measure accounts for changes in price
as well as any income from dividends). The study
uses a per fund benchmark, defined as the average
return of the assets in the fund’s investment uni-




r(ui). An asset is
cataloged as ‘good’ if its return in a given period
equals or exceeds the benchmark b. The subset of
8 Omission and commission errors can also be measured with
respect to sell decisions. This case is discussed later.
good assets that the fund bought during period t
is denoted A+ = {a|a ∈ A and r(a) ≥ b} and its
cardinality is denoted n+. Similarly, the bad assets
bought consist of A− = {a|a ∈ A and r(a) < b}
with cardinality n−.
At first sight, several measures might capture
the commission error of a fund. Two possibilities
are the number of bad assets bought, n−, and the
total negative return, TNR = −∑{a∈A−} r(a) (the
initial minus sign makes the measure increase in
the proper direction). Yet a problem now arises in
that—because different funds invest in a differ-
ent number of assets and in different investment
universes—these raw metrics are not comparable
across funds and, thus, are unsuitable for the pur-
poses of this study.
One way of solving the comparability problem
is to convert these raw error measures into prob-
abilistic measures that account for the specifics of
each situation. An example will help clarify this
point. Imagine you want to find out who is better
at games of chance—someone who flipped a coin
100 times and got 60 heads or someone who threw
a die 200 times and got 40 sixes. If a probability
distribution is placed on the outcomes (Pr{Head} =
1/2 and Pr{Six} = 1/6), it doesn’t matter that each
person played a different game; in both cases it is
possible to compute a statistic (in this case, a chi-
squared) and then compare the players in terms of
how unlikely their results were.
A first approach to creating probability-adjusted
measures of a fund’s errors is to use the hypergeo-
metric distribution. This distribution, whose prob-












, is typically illustrated in terms
of the probability of getting exactly r red marbles
after drawing m marbles (without replacement)
from an urn containing M marbles of which R
are red. Thus, replacing ‘marble’ with ‘stock’ and
‘red’ with ‘bad’ yields a function that computes
the probability of getting a given number of bad
stocks; the function is already adjusted for port-
folio size, universe size, and the number of bad
stocks in the investment universe. A nice feature
of this approach is that it removes the effect of the
environment from the error measures. For exam-
ple, an economy-wide shock that has a positive
effect on one type of fund but a negative effect on
another would not distort the measures of error.
In other words, that the negatively affected fund
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draws stocks from a ‘tougher’ urn than does the
positively affected fund is controlled for by the
hypergeometric distribution.
Using the bootstrap to compute a better
measure of omission and commission errors
The hypergeometric approach just illustrated can
be further improved by using the bootstrap, an
important development in statistics (Efron, 1979;
Efron and Tibshirani, 1993). One limitation of the
hypergeometric approach is that it weighs all bad
decisions equally, regardless of the size of the
errors (i.e., a stock that slightly underperformed
the benchmark is counted the same as a stock
whose price collapsed). The bootstrap allows one
to model a probability distribution that takes into
account the size of the errors.9
The bootstrap consists of creating an arbitrar-
ily good approximation of a population via Monte
Carlo simulations and using this new population
to compute the exact value of a statistic. In this
case, the population to be estimated is the set of
all possible portfolios of a given size that can
be drawn from a given investment universe. An
example will clarify how the bootstrap can be
used to measure commission errors. Suppose the
returns of the assets in the investment universe
of fund F are {−5%, −2%, −1%, 1%, 3%, 4%},
the benchmark is b = 0, and the fund bought the
three assets that ended up returning {−2%, −1%,
4%}. Hence F ’s total negative return is 3 percent
(TNR = −[−2% + −1%]). To assess how large or
small this number is, it must be compared to the
TNRs of the population of funds that can draw
three stocks from the same investment universe






lios could have been bought, but in realistic cases
the space of possible portfolios cannot be explored
exhaustively;10 hence the method relies on ran-
domly sampling the space of possible portfolios.
With the exception of some well-known patho-
logical cases (Davison and Hinkley, 1997, Sec.
9 Distinguishing between large and small errors is a natural
property to expect from a measure of errors—especially since
models that conceptualize perception as signal plus noise (such
as Sah and Stiglitz’s or signal detection theory) would predict
that blunders are less likely to occur than slight errors.
10 The average fund in the data set buys 16 stocks from a uni-







2.6), a statistic computed via bootstrap converges
to the real statistic as the number of random draws
increases. For the data used in this article, each
fund ‘competes’ against 100,000 simulated port-
folios and the standard error introduced by the
bootstrap procedure is less than 0.003.
Once the population of portfolios comparable to
a fund F is created, the measure of commission
error is simply a measure of the deviance of F ’s
error with respect to the commission errors of
that population. Given the central limit theorem
and the large number of simulations, the normal
distribution is a good approximation for the TNRs
of the population. Therefore, errors are reported in
terms of standardized scores; the higher the score,
the higher the error.
The omission error can be defined analogously
to the commission error. Instead of measuring
TNR, in this case one measures the total unbought
positive returns (TUPR)—that is, the sum of the
good assets that belong to the investment universe
of fund F but were not bought in the current
period. Mathematically, TUPR =∑{a∈U and a /∈A}
r(a). Following the previous example, the TUPR
of fund F is 4 percent (= 1% + 3%). As before,
the bootstrap is then used to compute a probability-
adjusted measure that is expressed as a standard-
ized score.
Data preparation and limitations of the data
set
The content and format of Morningstar’s one-
page mutual fund reports have changed repeatedly
over the years, and in 2007 it started including a
‘governance and management’ section with en-
ough information to code organizational structure
for a large sample of funds. This implies that
the data on organizational structure for Decem-
ber 2007 are available only as a snapshot. There-
fore, whereas the dependent variables are com-
puted using errors from 2004Q4 to 2007Q1, funds
that changed their organizational structure after
2004Q4 but before December 2007 are partially
misclassified in the analysis. Fortunately, changes
in the organizational structure of funds are rare.
There are no official statistics, but a good estimate
of change in the organizational structure of mutual
funds can be gathered from Morningstar (2008). In
addition to 500 fund reports, Morningstar (2008:
29) also includes a brief description of all the man-
agement changes that took place in these funds
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during 2007. Of the 500 reported funds, 32 expe-
rienced some sort of management change (the most
typical change is replacement of a manager) and
only four funds experienced a change in organi-
zational structure as coded in this article. This
amounts to a 0.8 percent yearly probability of such
change.
In December 2007, Morningstar kept organiza-
tional descriptions for 1,687 funds. To increase
comparability, only funds that were primarily
devoted to stocks (not other asset classes, such
as bonds or options) were selected. Thus, funds
were chosen if their asset composition (accord-
ing to the CRSP data set ‘Mutual Fund Profiles
and Monthly Asset Data’) was at least 60 percent
stocks in the time period under study. This nar-
rowed the list down to 1,087 funds. The CRSP data
sets ‘Portfolio Holding Information’ and ‘Monthly
Stocks’ were then used to choose only those funds
for which CRSP reported the returns of the indi-
vidual stocks owned by the fund for at least
50 percent of its portfolio value. This reduced the
list to 642 funds. This drop is primarily explained
by CRSP’s tracking only the returns of stocks
traded on NYSE, NASDAQ, and AMEX (while
many funds invest in international stocks) and to
a lesser extent by observations missing from the
CRSP portfolio holdings data set. Finally, funds
for which the Morningstar description did not
allow an organizational structure to be inferred
were dropped, leaving the final count at 609 funds
owned by 154 different parent firms. Collectively,
for the 10 quarters from 2004Q4 to 2007Q1,
these funds invested in 5,833 distinct stocks (as
identified by their CUSIP number), made 153,457
buy decisions, and had $1.6 trillion under manage-
ment at the end of the period. The range of dates
used is due to data limitations: before 2004Q4 the
CRSP holdings database is sparse; and by Decem-
ber 2007, CRSP had not yet uploaded the holdings
information for the quarters after 2007Q1.
The stocks that a fund bought during the quarter
ending at date t were determined by looking at
the stocks added to the portfolio since the last
reported quarterly holdings. The quarterly holdings
were gathered from the CRSP data set ‘Portfolio
Holdings Information,’ itself a compilation of the
Forms 13F that mutual funds submit to the SEC.
An intrinsic limitation of the data is that, if a stock
is bought and sold during the same quarter, that
buy decision is unobserved. However, this would
pose a problem only if the error measures of the
unobserved and observed trades differed in a way
that depended on organizational structure. There
are no reasons to believe a priori that this might
be the case.
The returns used to determine whether an invest-
ment was a good or a bad one were the quarterly
returns of each stock from the end of quarter t to
the end of quarter t + 1; these returns were gath-
ered from the CRSP data set ‘Monthly Stocks’
using the field ‘Holding Period Return,’ which
adjusts for stock splits and dividends. Because the
exact date at which assets are bought is unknown
(i.e., the holdings database has quarterly resolu-
tion), a further intrinsic limitation of the data set
is that it fails to account for the return accrued
since a stock is bought until the end of that quar-
ter. Yet this lack of data should affect the results
of the study in a conservative way. The reason is
that if managers are able to minimize the errors
they make, this ability should be more notice-
able soon after the decision than later, when more
unpredictable events may affect the price of their
purchase.
The investment universe of a fund at time t
was defined as all the stocks available for pur-
chase at time t from the union of all the hold-
ings reported by the fund in a trailing window
of seven quarters, including the current quarter
(i.e., using the last seven Forms 13F reported by
the fund). There are at least three other ways to
define the investment universe, but they present
conceptual and practical problems that make them
less preferable than the trailing-period definition.
The first alternative is to use the investment
objective, typically reported by each fund in its
prospectus; however, this information is
imprecise11 and not always available, so using it to
define the investment universe would have a sub-
jective quality. A second alternative is to include
all the 5,833 stocks ever bought by all the funds.
This approach was discarded because it is unfair
to count the failure to buy stocks that would never
be bought by a fund as ‘omissions’ (e.g., a utili-
ties fund does not buy high-tech stocks). A third
alternative is to use the union of all the stocks
11 For example, a fund may say that it attempts to track a broad
index like the S&P500, but this does not imply that it invests
only in stocks that are listed in the index; many of its investments
may fall outside it. Another fund may say that it invests in ‘small
caps,’ a broad category with thousands of stocks, though its
investments consistently fall within a group of fewer than 100
stocks.
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ever bought by the funds that share the same
Morningstar investment category. Like the previ-
ous alternative, this method creates loose invest-
ment universes that lead to a similar (albeit less
serious) unfairness problem. In short, letting the
deeds of the fund speak for themselves seemed
the most appropriate choice. Robustness checks
showed that the third alternative definition pro-
duced results qualitatively similar to those reported
here using the trailing-period definition.
RESULTS
Although mutual funds offer a unique window
into the effect of structure on performance, actu-
ally measuring that effect is relatively challeng-
ing. An ideal test would consist of comparing the
performance of mutual funds making investments
in the same sector, with the same managers, at
the same time, and differing only in organiza-
tional structure. This situation is unattainable, so
the challenge consists of statistically controlling
for differences other than organizational structure.
Fortunately, the bootstrap (explained earlier) and
the standard control variables in the mutual funds
literature (explained later) can control for these
differences.12
Each of the three hypotheses was tested using a
regression of the form
dependent variablei = α0 + α1Decentralizedi
+ α2Individuali + α3Betai + α4log(ParentSizei )
+ α5log(FundSizei ) + α6CatLGi + α7CatLBi
+ α8CatLVi + α9CatMCGi + α10CatSGi
+ α11CatSBi + α12CatMCBi + εi,
where the dependent variable is the logarithm
of the number of stocks bought per quarter to
test Hypothesis 1, omission error to test Hypothe-
sis 2, and commission error to test Hypothesis 3.
The independent variable of the study, organi-
zational structure, was coded as two dummies
representing the decentralized and the individual
structure (the centralized structure is the omitted
dummy).
12 For an example of the use of the bootstrap in the mutual fund
literature, see Kosowski et al. (2006); for a tutorial presentation,
see Burns (2004).
The controls used, which are in line with those
used in the mutual fund literature (e.g., Chen
et al., 2004), were: (1) Beta i , the risk profile of
the fund as measured by its Beta with respect to
the S&P500; (2) log(ParentSizei), the size of the
parent firm (the firm owning the fund) as mea-
sured by the logarithm of the number of mutual
funds that the parent firm owns (within the uni-
verse of 1,087 stock mutual funds tracked by
Morningstar); (3) log(FundSizei), the size of the
fund as measured by the logarithm of the net
assets managed by the fund (in millions of dol-
lars); and (4) CatXX i , seven investment category
dummies as coded by Morningstar (Large Growth,
Large Blend, Large Value, Mid-Cap Growth, Small
Growth, Small Blend, and Mid-Cap Blend).
Roughly 80 percent of the funds fell into one of
these seven categories; the rest were consolidated
in an ‘Other’ class that grouped 13 smaller cate-
gories and was used as the omitted dummy in the
regressions.
The regressions were run on a pooled cross-
section (and not in a panel) because there is
essentially no variation in the structure of the
mutual funds during the period analyzed. The num-
ber of observations in the regressions is 6,090,
since there are 609 funds and each one has
data for 10 periods. The omission and commis-
sion errors were computed as probabilities that
are independent of the specific environment the
fund was facing (i.e., actual stocks in the invest-
ment universe and its returns), which makes the
pooled cross-section specification an appropriate
choice.
To avoid a possible source of endogeneity,
all the controls were measured at the beginning
of the period used to compute the dependent
variables (beginning of 2004Q4). To counter the
effects of heteroskedasticity—and because obser-
vations coming from funds that belong to the same
parent firm may not be independent—the stan-
dard errors were computed using cluster-robust
estimation (Williams, 2000) with clusters defined
according to the parent firm. All reported p-values
correspond to two-tailed tests; this is a conserva-
tive decision because the hypotheses tested are of
the form a < b, which calls only for running one-
tailed tests.
Table 2 displays summary statistics and correla-
tions. The correlations show no evidence of mul-
ticollinearity, which is reaffirmed by the variance
inflation factors—none of which was larger than
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Table 2. Descriptive statistics and correlations (for the 609 funds in the sample)
mean sd min max 1 2 3 4
1 Omission error −0.16 0.48 −2.77 1.09 1.00
2 Commission error 0.14 0.47 −1.03 2.35 0.33 1.00
3 Beta 1.15 0.27 −0.09 2.77 0.01 0.05 1.00
4 log(ParentSize) 2.14 1.10 0.00 4.68 −0.11 0.06 −0.04 1.00
5 log(FundSize) 6.17 1.68 −0.24 11.25 0.06 0.08 −0.14 0.32
Table 3. Results of regression analysis of number of stocks bought
Dependent variable: log(#stocks bought)
A1 A2 A3 A4 A5
Decentralized (structure N/1) 0.647∗∗∗ 0.630∗∗∗ 0.582∗∗∗ 0.580∗∗∗ 0.544∗∗∗
(0.141) (0.138) (0.167) (0.169) (0.162)
Individual (structure 1/1) 0.119 0.091 0.041 0.041 0.047
(0.100) (0.100) (0.090) (0.090) (0.091)
Beta 0.848∗∗∗ 0.880∗∗∗ 0.883∗∗∗ 0.419+
(0.236) (0.245) (0.253) (0.250)




Category effects (joint test) ∗∗∗
Constant 2.215∗∗∗ 1.259∗∗∗ 0.851∗∗ 0.832∗ 0.982∗
(0.097) (0.273) (0.325) (0.399) (0.414)
Observations 6090 6090 6090 6090 6090
Adjusted R2 0.030 0.090 0.137 0.135 0.213
Note: Robust standard errors between parentheses.
+ p < 0.10, ∗p < 0.05, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗∗p < 0.001 (two-tailed tests).
1.6, a number well below the customary thresh-
old of 10. Of the 609 funds in the data set, the
most common structure is the individual manager
(324 funds), followed by the centralized structure
(233 funds) and the decentralized structure (52
funds).
Number of projects accepted
To test Hypothesis 1, the number of stocks bought
by each fund was analyzed.13 In order to determine
whether the relationship between organizational
structure and number of stocks bought is statisti-
cally significant, five models were tested (Table 3).
Given that the distribution of the number of stocks
bought is highly skewed (see, e.g., the relation-
ship between the average and the maximum in
13 As a robustness check, the number of stocks sold by each
fund was also analyzed. The results were qualitatively the same
as those presented here for the number of stocks bought.
row 1 of Table 4), its logarithm was used as a
dependent variable. In all the models, the decen-
tralized structure (N /1) was associated with buying
significantly more stocks than the centralized struc-
ture (the effect size corresponds to a 30 to 50%
increase, depending on the model and the value of
the controls). No significant relationship is present
for the structure 1/1, yet the sign of its associated
coefficients has the predicted direction in all the
models.
The coefficients associated with the controls tell
stories that are interesting in themselves. Models
A3 to A5 show that funds belonging to larger par-
ent firms buy more stocks—even after the size
of the mutual fund and investment category are
controlled for. One possible interpretation is that
larger parent firms have better support structures,
allowing managers to track more stocks. The
regressions also show that the more net assets man-
aged by a fund, the more stocks it will invest in;
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1) #stocks bought per quarter 15.9 (27.9) 15.3 (16.7) 26.1 (27.2) 16.5 (22.7)
[1.2, 280.0] [1.3, 131.2] [3.4, 148.2] [1.2, 280.0]
2) #stocks in portfolio 91.5 (105.9) 138.6 (293.7) 171.1 (168.3) 123.3 (230.6)
[18.6, 1220.3] [20.3, 3455.2] [25.6, 990.9] [18.6, 3455.2]
this may reflect that large funds are more likely
to run into the liquidity limits of the underlying
stocks. The fact that Beta has a positive effect can
also be explained in terms of liquidity, as higher-
Beta stocks, on average, correspond to smaller
firms. Finally, Model A5 shows that there is a
significant category effect, which gives additional
support to the liquidity explanation because the
categories with the largest positive coefficients are
those involving small companies (only the cate-
gories Small Growth and Small Blend were statis-
tically significant, with respective coefficients of
0.55 and 0.91).
Models A1 to A5 were rerun using portfolio
size instead of number of stocks bought per quar-
ter, and all the results were qualitatively the same.
This increases confidence in the results by show-
ing that what is true for a flow variable (number
of stocks bought) is also true for its corresponding
stock variable (portfolio size). In all, the large and
significant coefficients accompanying the decen-
tralized structure provide ample evidence that
decentralized funds accept more projects than do
centralized funds (Hypothesis 1).
It is remarkable that this statistically signifi-
cant relationship between structure and portfolio
size has not been reported in the finance litera-
ture—probably because researchers in that field
have conceptualized organizational structure sim-
ply as number of managers (e.g., Chen et al.,
2004). Measuring structure as number of managers
is roughly equivalent to comparing the average
portfolio size of structure N/N and N/1 (since
both structures have N managers) against the port-
folio size of structure 1/1. Under that averaging,
no difference is noticeable. (In particular, from
the numbers in Table 4, one can easily calcu-
late that the average portfolio size of N/N and
N /1 is 131.3; and this is not statistically differ-
ent from the portfolio size of structure 1/1, which
is 138.6.) In other words, if structure is mea-
sured in the wrong way, the relationship between
structure and portfolio size is rendered invisi-
ble even though that relation is actually quite
strong.
Omission and commission errors
Figure 1 displays the average omission and
commission error made by each organizational
structure. The axes of the figure correspond to the
standardized measures previously described (com-
puted via bootstrap). The figure looks exactly as
Sah and Stiglitz’s model would predict, with the
centralized fund at the lower right (minimizing
commission errors), the decentralized fund at the
upper left (minimizing omission errors), and the
individual manager in between.
Figure 1. Average (centroids) omission and commission
errors of the three organizational structures
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Table 5. Results of regression analysis of omission error
Dependent variable: omission error
B1 B2 B3 B4 B5
Decentralized (structure N /1) −0.162∗ −0.162∗ −0.150∗ −0.172∗ −0.161∗
(0.077) (0.077) (0.069) (0.074) (0.078)
Individual (structure 1/1) −0.054 −0.054 −0.042 −0.044 −0.043
(0.046) (0.046) (0.046) (0.046) (0.047)
Beta 0.019 0.011 0.037 0.034
(0.071) (0.071) (0.071) (0.078)




Category effects (joint test) not sig.
Constant −0.119∗∗ −0.140 −0.039 −0.235+ −0.217+
(0.039) (0.089) (0.100) (0.127) (0.130)
Observations 6090 6090 6090 6090 6090
Adjusted R2 0.005 0.004 0.014 0.024 0.022
Note: Robust standard errors between parentheses.
+ p < 0.10, ∗p < 0.05, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗∗p < 0.001 (two-tailed tests).
All five models in Table 5 support Hypothe-
sis 2 by showing that a decentralized fund makes
significantly fewer omissions than a centralized
one. The magnitude of the coefficients associ-
ated with the decentralized structure is sizable,
as it can be shown that decreasing an error by
0.15 points of the standardized score is associated
with a 13 percent increase in annual performance
(relative to current performance; e.g., a 10% annual
return would become 11.3%).14 As in the previous
set of regressions, the coefficients accompanying
the individual manager have the correct sign but
are not statistically significant.
Among the controls, parent size and net assets
appear to be significant determinants of omission
errors. The fact that funds owned by larger firms
make fewer omissions indicates that the ability
to avoid missing investment opportunities may
reside partly in routines that are more likely to
exist in larger firms, such as research support ser-
vices, fund manager training, or knowledge sharing
among managers of different funds. Conversely,
the finding that funds managing more assets make
more omission errors may be due, in part, to large
14 To compute the effect on a fund’s annual return, a simulation
was run using parameters representative of the average fund.
This fund buys 16 stocks from a universe of 195 stocks each
quarter; the stock’s returns are drawn from a N(0.0339, 0.2042)
distribution; the portfolio turnover is one year; and the effect due
to superior stock picking is only effective (this is a conservative
assumption) in the quarter after the stock was bought.
funds having little incentive to exploit small, yet
profitable investment opportunities because their
relative contribution to the fund’s overall prof-
itability would be tiny.
All the models in Table 6 support Hypothesis 3
by showing that a decentralized fund makes signifi-
cantly more commission errors than does a central-
ized one. As before, the coefficients for the indi-
vidual manager have the predicted sign but are not
significant. Parent size and net assets, which were
significant controls in the regressions of omission
error, are not significant predictors of commis-
sion error; this may mean that small funds devote
comparatively more resources to minimizing com-
mission (rather than omission) errors.
Two controls that are typically significant in
studies of investment performance—the fund’s
Beta and its investment category—are not signif-
icant predictors of either omission or commission
errors. The reason is that the bootstrap mechanism
used to compute the errors already controls for
these parameters: each fund is compared in stan-
dardized terms against a large number of funds
that draw stocks from the same investment uni-
verse and so, on average, have the same Beta and
investment category as the focal fund.
Ruling out alternative hypotheses
Mutual funds offer the best available setting to test
the Sah and Stiglitz model’s predictions because
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Table 6. Results of regression analysis of commission error
Dependent variable: commission error
C1 C2 C3 C4 C5
Decentralized (structure N /1) 0.184∗∗ 0.183∗∗ 0.177∗ 0.164∗ 0.146∗
(0.068) (0.067) (0.071) (0.075) (0.073)
Individual (structure 1/1) 0.054 0.051 0.045 0.044 0.045
(0.044) (0.044) (0.042) (0.041) (0.041)
Beta 0.079 0.083 0.098 0.082
(0.079) (0.080) (0.088) (0.103)




Category effects (joint test) not sig.
Constant 0.097∗∗ 0.008 −0.042 −0.156 −0.183
(0.033) (0.103) (0.118) (0.178) (0.207)
Observations 6090 6090 6090 6090 6090
Adjusted R2 0.008 0.008 0.010 0.012 0.013
Note: Robust standard errors between parentheses.
+ p < 0.10, ∗p < 0.05, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗∗p < 0.001 (two-tailed tests).
this setting offers observability of structure and
omissions, a large number of observations, and
cross-sectional variance in structure. At the same
time, the setting is not perfect because there is
essentially no variation of structure over time.
This means that when making causal interpreta-
tions, close attention must be paid to possible
endogeneity and unobserved heterogeneity issues.
The following logic shows how difficult it is to
construct alternative hypotheses that might bias the
results in the same direction as predicted by the
Sah and Stiglitz model.
The controls used in the regressions (for parent
and firm size, risk profile, and the investment cate-
gory dummies) serve to rule out simple alternative
hypotheses such as relating a type of error to an
investment strategy. More importantly, the boot-
strap (described earlier)—by controlling for the
specific environment faced by each fund—takes
care of a large set of possible issues, such as the
effect that economy-wide shocks could have on
different funds.
Unobserved heterogeneity seems unlikely for
two reasons. First, any unobserved heterogene-
ity explanation due to a deliberate preference
of managers for omission or commission errors
seems implausible because mutual fund managers
are primarily concerned with surpassing a bench-
mark, not with how this benchmark is surpassed,
and omission and commission errors contribute
equally to the performance of the fund vis-a`-vis
the benchmark. Omission and commission errors
are equally costly for mutual funds. After all, fail-
ing to buy a stock that would have contributed
$1 to returns is no more or less costly than
buying a stock that subtracted $1 from returns;
in both cases there is a loss of $1 with respect
to a competing fund that did not make the same
error.
Second, most imaginable unobserved character-
istics should affect both buy and sell decisions.
Yet it turns out that structure affects only the buy
decisions. (In regressions for the omission and
commission errors on the sell decisions, available
from the author on request, none of the structure
coefficients was significant.) This is consistent with
a mechanism that surfaced during informal inter-
views with fund managers. They revealed that,
although the purchase of stocks is quite delibera-
tive, the sale of stocks is a semiautomatic process
that is often guided by stop-loss orders or tax and
liquidity considerations.
Another issue that may bias the results would
be incorrect imputation of organizational structure.
It could be argued that some of the funds that
are coded as being managed by one individual
are really managed by either a hierarchy (N/N)
or a polyarchy (N /1), but that these details do
not appear in the Morningstar report from which
structure is coded. Yet if that were the case, it
Copyright  2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Strat. Mgmt. J., 33: 611–632 (2012)
DOI: 10.1002/smj
628 F. A. Csaszar
would bias the conclusions against the hypoth-
esized results—namely, it would be harder for
funds coded as hierarchy and polyarchy to be sta-
tistically different from the mass of funds coded as
individually managed. In other words, Morningstar
reports that were imprecise in this way would bias
the results in a conservative fashion.
DISCUSSION
This study has used mutual funds as a rich
data source to explore how organizational struc-
ture affects organizational performance. In perfect
accordance with the predictions of the Sah and
Stiglitz model of fallible decision making, decen-
tralized structures accept more projects (Hypothe-
sis 1), make fewer omission errors (Hypothesis 2),
and make more commission errors (Hypothesis 3)
than do centralized structures. This section places
these results in perspective.
Mutual funds and organizational structure
Two questions come to mind regarding the orga-
nization design of mutual funds: is there an opti-
mal organizational structure for mutual funds? And
why is the individual manager the most common
structure? (Note that 53.2% of the funds in the data
set used this structure.)
As mentioned previously, omission and commis-
sion errors are equally costly for a mutual fund
concerned only with maximizing returns. Hence,
the structure this hypothetical fund should choose
is the one that minimizes the sum of both errors.
Strikingly, the sum of the omission and commis-
sion errors (measured as standardized scores) for
each of the three structures is statistically indis-
tinguishable from zero (i.e., if the coordinates
of the points on Figure 1 are added, the results
are −0.28 + 0.28 = 0.00, −0.17 + 0.15 = −0.02,
and −0.12 + 0.10 = −0.02 for structures N /1,
1/1, and N/N , respectively). Given this equiva-
lency in overall errors, it seems natural that most
funds choose the least expensive structure. The
existence of funds with structures different from
1/1 may speak to other concerns, such as secur-
ing continuity against manager turnover, offering
promotion opportunities to junior employees, or
creating a differentiated product.
There is a special beauty to the fact that in
the mutual fund setting, the overall error of each
structure is not different from the overall error of
picking stocks at random: the unpredictability of
returns stated by the efficient market hypothesis
holds when looking at the overall error, even
if each error measured independently is partly
predictable. This equivalency in the cost of errors
is also beneficial (and perhaps essential) for the
purposes of the empirical test carried out in this
article, for otherwise it is likely that mutual funds
would all flock to the structure minimizing the
relevant error and thereby drain the data set of
variation in the independent variable.
Thus, the mutual fund setting has a particu-
lar characteristic that does not generalize to other
domains: in the structure-errors-performance chain
of causation, structure affects errors (i.e., organi-
zational performance) but errors (as long as they
cost the same and add up to the same overall
error) do not affect competitive performance. In
most other settings (in which the two errors have
different costs), errors should affect competitive
performance. Generalizing results to such other
domains is discussed next.
Generalizability to other domains
This article’s proof of the hypotheses derived from
Sah and Stiglitz (1986) serves as a foundation on
which to guide structure recommendations. The
key observation in this context is realizing that dif-
ferent organizations face different costs for omis-
sion and commission errors. For example, juries
are more concerned with commission errors (i.e.,
to avoid convicting the innocent); the typical IT
department also is presumably more concerned
with minimizing commission errors (e.g., not leak-
ing sensitive information) than with minimizing
omission errors (e.g., implementing every good
IT innovation); and a well-funded R&D lab in an
industry characterized by first-mover advantages is
more likely to be concerned with avoiding omis-
sion errors. Thus, this article supports the follow-
ing recommendations for organizations aiming to
choose the best structure given the environment it
faces: if the omission error is the costlier error,
the organization is better served by a polyarchical
(N /1) structure; if the commission error is costlier,
the organization is better served by a hierarchical
(N /N) structure.15
15 It is possible to make finer-grained structure recommendations
(i.e., recommending a specific N and C) by feeding into the
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This research also speaks to the unexplored
question of what are the processes that link orga-
nizational structure to exploration and exploita-
tion (Siggelkow and Levinthal, 2003: 650; Argyres
and Silverman, 2004: 929; Raisch and Birkinshaw,
2008: 380). A relevant observation in address-
ing this question is that omission and commission
errors are another way of looking at exploration
and exploitation (Garud et al., 1997: 33; Garicano
and Posner, 2005: 157). The logic of this argu-
ment is that, on the one hand, firms in unstable or
fermenting environments must try to avoid omis-
sions because these curtail the extent of explo-
ration of new high-fitness positions. Illustrations
of this behavior are Bill Gates saying that ‘the
real sin is if we (Microsoft’s R&D) miss some-
thing’ (Hawn, 2004: 70) and Andy Grove’s quip,
‘miss the moment (for change in a high-tech firm
such as Intel) and you start to decline’ (Strat-
ford, 1993: 58). On the other hand, firms fac-
ing stable or incrementally changing environments
try to avoid commission errors, since these could
disrupt their currently efficient exploitative opera-
tions. Examples of these phenomena include Proc-
ter & Gamble, where new product proposals are
often reviewed more than 40 times before reaching
the CEO (Herbold, 2002), and IBM’s mainframe
era inspired ‘nonconcur policy,’ which enabled any
department to veto projects initiated anywhere in
the firm (Gerstner, 2003). Hence, given that (1) it
has been shown here how organizational structure
can influence the omission and commission errors
made by organizations and (2) previous research
has shown that these errors control the degree
to which organizations can explore and exploit,
this article exposes a mechanism by which orga-
nizational structure can influence exploration and
exploitation.
A core debate in strategy and organization
design has concerned the direction of causality in
the relationship between strategy and structure. On
the one hand, there is Chandler’s (1962) famous
dictum that ‘structure follows strategy.’ On the
other hand, several authors have argued in favor of
a reverse, complementary logic—in other words,
that structure may also influence strategy (see, e.g.,
Burton and Kuhn, 1980: 4; Burgelman, 1983: 61;
Pettigrew, 1987: 665). The current article describes
model information about the situation in question (e.g., cost of
each of the errors, cost of each decision maker).
clear mechanisms for both directions of the causal-
ity arrow. If strategy is understood as the pool of
all the projects pursued by the organization (akin
to Mintzberg’s (1978) concept of emergent strat-
egy), then structure influences the types of project
that end up in that pool (e.g., hierarchy decreases
commission errors) and, thus, structure influences
strategy. On the other hand, if strategy is under-
stood as a deliberate plan (i.e., in a Chandlerian
way), the role of organization becomes subordi-
nate to strategy (e.g., a firm that wants to reduce
commission errors decides to use a hierarchical
structure) and so strategy influences structure.
Further work
Further research could employ alternative settings
(or perhaps alternative experiments) to explore the
predictions of the model that cannot be tested
using the current data set. Some questions open
to empirical examination involve the omission and
commission errors associated with structures other
than those studied here, as well as how commit-
tee decision making interacts with other organiza-
tional dynamics, such as power. Another line of
inquiry, very much in the spirit of contingency
theory, could explore whether firms that exhibit
better structure–environment fit achieve higher
performance or exhibit higher survival rates. For
example, in industries requiring more conserva-
tive decision making (i.e., where commissions are
costlier than omissions), one would expect the per-
formance of firms using higher consensus levels to
surpass those using lower levels.
In more general terms, this article also sug-
gests that decomposing performance into omission
and commission errors can reveal phenomena oth-
erwise unobservable when using standard per-
formance measures. Hence, future research on
organizations may benefit from including omission
and commission errors as alternative measures of
performance.
Conclusions
From a theoretical point of view, this research
presents a mechanism by which micro decisions
are aggregated into macro behaviors and links
to important questions of strategy research—for
example, ‘do organizations have predictable
biases?’ (Cyert and March, 1963: 21), ‘what do
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we know about the relationships between organi-
zational size (or other stable characteristics) and
behavior?’ (Rumelt et al., 1994: 42), and ‘what is
the relationship between decision making and deci-
sion outcomes?’ (Zajac and Bazerman, 1991: 37).
From a practical standpoint, this research sheds
light on how the structure of organizations can
be modified to compensate for the shortcomings
of individuals, and it allows several managerial
concerns to be addressed: what type of organi-
zation is required in order to avoid exceeding a
given error level? Is it true that hierarchy ham-
pers innovation? What organizational structures
can lead to more innovation? In regard to this
last question, an important area of application is
enabling established organizations to exhibit traits
usually associated with entrepreneurial ventures.
The 9/11 Commission Report contains an eloquent
call for this sort of transformation: ‘imagination is
not a gift usually associated with bureaucracies . . .
it is therefore crucial to find a way of routinizing,
even bureaucratizing, the exercise of imagination’
(National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon
the United States, 2004: 344).
Maritan and Schendel (1997: 259) observe that
‘there has been surprisingly little work that has
explicitly examined the link between the pro-
cesses by which strategic decisions are made and
their influence on strategy.’ This article aims to
illuminate that topic by advancing a small step
toward understanding how organizational struc-
ture aggregates individual decisions into strategic
outcomes.
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